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Bank Mergers in North America: Comparing the 
Approaches in the United States and Canada 
Eric J. Gauvin* 
This paper provides a summary comparison of the processes in the United 
States and Canada for governmental approval of bank mergers. The topic came to 
prominence in 1998 when four of Canada's five largest banks unveiled plans that 
would have resulted in the Royal Bank of Canada merging with the Bank of 
Montreal1 and the Toronto Dominion Bank combining with the Canadian 
Imperial Bank of Commerce ("CIBC").2 These proposed mergers were rejected 
by the then Finance Minister, Paul Martin.3 The reasons given included: 
• 	 the resulting banking industry structure would have concentrated too 
much economic power in the hands of too few financial institutions; 
• 	 the combinations would have reduced competition in the Canadian 
financial services sector; and 
• 	 the reduction in the number of banks would have reduced the 
Canadian government's flexibility to address future concerns.4 
Although the government rejected the 1998 mergers, the Finance Department 
in 1999 acknowledged that business combinations could be an appropriate 
business strategy in some circumstances.5 The government promised guidance as 
to when such combinations of large banks would be permitted.6 In 2001, the 
Department of Finance set forth its broad outlines for bank merger policy.7 One 
of the obvious differences with U.S. law is that the Canadian approach explicitly 
provides that the views of the public and political leaders are to be incorporated 
* Associate Dean and Professor of Law at Western New England College School of Law, B.A. Cornell 
University, J.D. LL.M. Boston University, MPA Harvard University. The author thanks his research assistant, 
Angela Bell, for her tireless efforts and also thanks the participants at the symposium on International Financial 
Services: Diverse Approaches in a Globalized Environment, held at the University of the Pacific-McGeorge 
School of Law, November 5, 2004, for their thoughtful comments. 
I. MAURIZIO BEVILACQUA, M.P. CHAIRMAN, THE FuTuRE STARTS Now: A STUDY ON THE FiNANCIAL 
SERVICES SECTOR IN CANADA, REPORT OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON FINANCE, Dec. 1998, available at 
http://www .pari. gc.ca!InfocomDod36!1/FINNStudies/Reports/finarpl12-e.htm. 
2. 	 /d. 
3. 	 Steven Theobald, Big 4 Lash Out at Scrapped Linkups, THE TORONTO STAR, Dec. 15, 1998. 
4. See STANDING COMMITTEE ON FiNANCE (DEB.), Nov. 6, 1998, available at http://www.parl. 
gc.ca/InfoComDoc/36/1/FINNMeetings/Evidence/finaev154-e.htm; HON. LORNE NYSTROM, M.P., 
THE PuBLIC INTEREST IMPLICATIONS OF LARGE BANK MERGERS: A DISSENTING OPINION, Mar. 2003, available 
at http://www .parl.gc.ca!InfoComDoc/3712/FINNStudies/Reports/finarp03/17 -ndp-e.htm. 
5. See DEPT. OF FIN., REFORMING CANADA'S FIN. SERVICES SECTOR: A FRAMEWORK FOR THE FUTURE, 
at 22 (June 25, 1999), available at http://www.fin.gc.ca/finserv/docs/finservrept_e.pdf. 
6. 	 /d. 
7. See DEPT. OF FIN., MERGER REVIEW GUIDELINES, available at http://www.fin.gc.ca/news01/ 
data/OI-014_2e.html. 
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into the merger approval process. Since the issuance of the bank merger policy, 
the government has promised specific guidance about what types of combinations 
will be permitted, but it has yet to complete that policy document. 
This paper provides a comparison, in summary form, of the U.S. and 
Canadian approaches to the approval of bank mergers. It starts with a brief 
explanation of U.S. bank merger law and then lays out the evolving Canadian 
approach to large bank mergers. It concludes with a discussion of whether the 
Canadian approach will help the regulators of Canadian financial institutions 
address the deficiencies identified in the 1998 transactions. 
I. A SUMMARY OF THE U.S. BANK MERGER PROCESS 
In the United States, all bank acquisitions are subject to review for 
anticompetitive effect, but such review involves different regulatory statutes and 
different regulatory agencies depending on whether banks or bank holding 
companies are involved.8 In general, acquisitions involving a merger of two 
banks are regulated under the Bank Merger Ad, with the key regulator 
dependent on the type of institution involved. By contrast, acquisitions by 
holding companies are governed by Section 3(c) of the Bank Holding Company 
Act ("BHCA"), 10 with the Federal Reserve being the key regulator. In both cases 
however, the operative statutory standards are essentially the same. Each statute 
prohibits transactions that have an anticompetitive effect. 11 
8. See PATRICIA A. MCCOY, BANKING LAW MANUAL§ 10 (2d ed. 2001) (for an overview of the U.S. 
scheme for approving mergers and acquisitions of banks); Joseph J. Norton & Christopher D. Olive, A By­
Product of the Globalization Process: The Rise of Cross-Border Bank Mergers and Acquisitions-The U.S. 
Regulatory Framework, 56 Bus. LAW. 591 (2001). 
9. The Bank Merger Act, Pub. L. No. 89-356, 80 Stat. 7 (1966) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. 
§1828(c)(5) (2005)). Despite its name, the Act now applies to a merger involving any insured depository 
institution. 
10. 	 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c) (2005). 
11. 	 ld. at§ 1842(c)(l)(A)-(B). 

The specific language prohibits transactions that: 

[A] ... would result in a monopoly, or which would be in furtherance of any combination 
or conspiracy to monopolize or to attempt to monopolize the business of banking in any part of 
the United States, or 
[B] . . . whose effect in any section of the country may be substantially to lessen 
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly, or which in any other manner would be in 
restraint of trade, unless it finds that the anticompetitive effects of the proposed transaction are 
clearly outweighed in the public interest by the probable effect of the transaction in meeting the 
convenience and needs of the community to be served. 
!d. 
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Bank regulators engage in a standard antitrust analysis of the merger to 
determine anticompetitive effects. The antitrust inquiry focuses on the market 
concentration that results from the merger in the relevant product and geographic 
markets. The case of United States v. Phillipsburg National Bank and Trust 
Company sets forth the classic formulation of this test: 
[A] merger which produces a firm controlling an undue percentage of the 
relevant market, and results in a significant increase in the concentration 
of firms in that market, is so inherently likely to lessen competition 
substantially that it must be enjoined in the absence of evidence clearly 
showing that the merger is not likely to have such anti-competitive 
effects. 12 
The merger approval analysis also requires that any anticompetitive effects 
be balanced against community needs. A range of specific factors may figure into 
a determination of community needs. Particularly important factors include 
improving the ability of the surviving bank to provide a broader spectrum of 
services and products, improving its ability to respond to the community's 
borrowing needs with larger lending limits, and the potential of the merger to 
spur economic growth of the community. 13 
However, bank mergers and holding company acquisitions are also subject to 
antitrust challenge after a regulatory decision is made. 14 In such a challenge, the 
Bank Merger Act generally provides that acquisitions to which it is applicable are 
governed by the standard quoted above, rather than the general antitrust merger 
standard. 15 Even with the same statutory standard, competitive factors are likely 
to receive greater emphasis by antitrust enforcers making case selection decisions 
and perhaps by courts applying that standard. 
In 1978, Congress passed the Change in Bank Control Act. 16 Broadly 
speaking, the Act requires covered "persons" to notify the relevant banking 
regulator of a purchase of "control" of a bank. The regulatory agency then has a 
12. United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'! Bank & Trust Co. et al, 399 U.S. 350, 366 (1970). The classic 
antitrust case discussing the geographical and product market analysis required to determine anticompetitive 
effects is United States v. Philadelphia Nat'! Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963). 
13. MICHAEL MALLOY, 2 THE CORPORATE LAW OF BANKS-REGULATION OF CORPORATE AND 
SECURITIES ACTIVITIES OF DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS §§ 9.2.4, 833-34 n.47 (1988) (collecting the relevant 
cases and other authorities). 
14. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(6). The Act requires that notice of the merger be sent to the Attorney General, 
as well as other bank regulators, as part of the regulatory approval process. /d. 
15. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(7)(B). See also 15 U.S.C. §18 (2005) (the general antitrust merger statute is§ 7 of 
the Clayton Act). 
16. Pub. L. No. 95-630, § 901, 92 Stat. 3678 (codified as amended in 12 U.S.C. § 1817G) (2005)). 
Similar provisions apply to terminating federal insurance coverage on such a change in control. See id 
§ 1730(q). The Act was amended in 1989 to reach all insured depository institutions. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 
§ 204(c), 103 Stat. 103 (amending 12 U.S.C. § 1817(j)). For a general discussion of the Act, see MALLOY, supra 
note 13, at § 4.3. 
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specified period to disapprove the transaction. 17 The definition of these two 
statutory terms is crucial to the Act's application. "Person" is defined broadly to 
include individuals, a long list of different types of business organizations, and 
"any other form of entity not specifically listed herein." 18 "Control" is defined as 
the direct or indirect power "to direct the management or policies of an insured 
depository institution or to vote 25 per centum or more of any class of voting 
securities ..." 19 This expansive definition is well adapted to deal with the 
realities of control and to reach any actual changes of control. Agency 
regulations, authorized by the statute, further expand this definition and create 
presumptions of control at lower thresholds of stock ownership. 20 
The Act gives several standards for disapproval. First, the transaction may be 
disapproved if it has the anticompetitive effects described above. 21 Disapproval is 
also authorized if the agency makes a finding that the acquiring person's 
financial condition, competence, or integrity is suspect. 22 Finally, disapproval is 
appropriate if the transaction would have an adverse effect on the federal deposit 
insurance funds. 23 
When acting on a bank holding company's application to acquire a bank 
under section 3 of the BHCA,24 section 210 of the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 ("FDICIA")25 requires the Federal 
Reserve Board to consider the managerial resources of a bank holding company 
or a bank. This includes evaluating the competence, experience, and integrity of 
the officers, directors, and principal shareholders of each institution. 
It is interesting to note the policy choice made by Congress in selecting the 
decision-making forum with primary responsibility for bank and bank holding 
company mergers. Both statutes specify that the initial determination is to be 
made by the appropriate banking agency, rather than by the courts or by the 
legislative branch. The reasons for that choice are likely rooted in one of the 
classic arguments for the administrative state: the banking agencies know more 
about banking than other bodies might, so they should be entrusted with making 
this decision. In addition, the administrative agencies may be the designated 
decision makers because of the politically insulated position they hold. While 
agencies are perhaps seen as likely to be more sympathetic to community needs 
than are the courts, they are less likely to be swayed by public opinion than the 
legislature. Decisions that a legislature might be tempted to make solely on 
17. 12 u.s.c. § 1817(j)(l) (2004). 
18. !d. § 1817(j)(8)(A). 
19. /d.§ 1817(j)(8)(B). 
20. 12 C.F.R. §§ 303.4(a), 550(d) (Comptroller), and § 225.4(d) (Federal Reserve Board). 
21. 12 U.S.C. § 1817(j)(7)(A) and (B). 
22. !d.§ 1817(j)(7)(C) and (D). 
23. ld. § 1817(j)(7)(F). 
24. ld. § 1842(c). 
25. Pub. L. No. 102-242, § 303, 105 Stat. 2236 (1991) (codified as amended in 12 U.S.C.A. § 1831a 
(West 2005)). 
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political grounds can be handled in a more technocratic manner by the 
administrative agencies by virtue of the political insulation those agencies enjoy. 
However, the regulatory agencies do solicit public comment during the 
merger approval process. The public comment process goes hand-in-hand with 
the agencies' required review of the institutions' Community Reinvestment Act 
("CRA") compliance.26 The CRA was enacted in 1977 to create incentives for 
depository institutions to address the credit needs of the communities in which 
they operate, especially in low- and moderate-income neighborhoods, consistent 
with safe and sound banking operations. The CRA requires that each insured 
depository institution's record in helping meet the credit needs of its entire 
community be evaluated periodically. That record is taken into account, among 
other times, when an institution applies for additional powers under the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, or when the institution seeks to expand its business, 
including through mergers and acquisitions. 
II. A SUMMARY OF THE CANADIAN BANK MERGER PROCESS 
In 2001, the Department of Finance kept its promise to provide guidelines for 
mergers of large banks. It set forth its broad outlines for bank merger policy in a 
press release. 27 The Merger Review Guidelines ("MRG") seek to find the optimal 
size for internationally active financial institutions while avoiding the problems 
of undue concentration of economic power and reduced competition in the 
banking sector at home. On their face, the MRG set out an extensive review 
process for merger proposals involving large banks and bank holding companies 
(i.e., those organizations with equity in excess of $5 billion). However, under 
closer inspection, the guidelines lack specific content as to what kinds of 
combinations might raise concerns based on competitive, prudential, or public 
interest matters. The government has promised additional guidance to spell out 
those factors, but political concerns have delayed their publication. Under the 
MRG, the banks proposing to merge would be required to prepare a public 
interest impact assessment ("PIIA"). The PIIA would have to justify the business 
objectives of the merger and provide a discussion of a range of effects of the 
merger, such as job losses and branch closures, as well as the impact of the 
transaction on the structure of the Canadian banking industry and the place of 
Canadian banks in the international financial services marketplace. 
If the proposed transaction would require remediation or mitigation of 
adverse effects, such as by divesting certain assets to avoid undue concentration, 
the PIIA would have to contain those plans as well. The PIIA should be informed 
26. 12 U.S.C. § 2901; 12 C.F.R. §§ 25, 228, 345, and 563e. 
27. See DEPT. OF FIN., MERGER REVIEW GUIDELINES, available at http://www.fin.gc.ca/news 
Olldata/01-014_2e.html. The discussion that follows is a short summary of the guidelines found at that URL. 
Specific citations will not be provided for each point. 
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by public needs and sentiments and the proposed review process would include 
an avenue for obtaining input from the public. 
Once the PIIA was complete, the proposed transaction would then be 
referred to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance and to the 
Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade, and Commerce for consideration 
and public hearings. These committees, in turn, would report to the Minister of 
Finance on the matters of public interest raised by the proposed transactions. This 
overtly political process has no specific analogue in U.S. law. On a separate 
track, both the Competition Bureau and the Office of the Superintendent of 
Financial Institutions ("OSFI") would also review the merger proposal and report 
to the Minister of Finance their views on the competitive and prudential aspects, 
respectively, of the proposed transaction. The Minister of Finance, after 
balancing all of this data, would then approve or disapprove the transaction in 
light of any prudential, competitive, or public interest issues raised during the 
review process. 
Short of outright denial, the Minister could negotiate remedies or 
modifications to the merger plans that could allow the transaction to move ahead 
while addressing the concerns. Specifically, if the concerns stemmed from 
competition effects, the Competition Bureau would arrange the appropriate 
remedies, while if the concerns involved primarily safety and soundness issues 
the OSFI would take the lead on remediation discussions. The Competition 
Bureau and the OSFI together with the Department of Finance would jointly 
address other public interest issues. 
After the MRG were issued and had been discussed in the political arena, the 
Minister of Finance in October 2002 asked the House of Commons Standing 
Committee on Finance and the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade, 
and Commerce for their views on the major considerations that would apply in 
determining whether a merger proposal between large banks is in the public 
interest. The Senate Committee issued its report on this matter in December, 
2002,28 and the House of Commons committee issued its report in March, 2003. 29 
While the Government has responded to both the Senate and Commons 
reports,30 the Government itself has yet to articulate its own views about when 
bank mergers would be in the public interest. The Government's guidance was 
supposed to be issued by June 30, 2004, 31 but in the spring of 2004 they were 
28. THE HON. E. LEO KOLBER., CHAIR, COMPETITION IN THE PuBLIC INTEREST: LARGE BANK MERGERS 
IN CANADA, THE STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, TRADE AND COMMERCE SIXTH REPORT, Dec. 
2002, available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/2/parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/bank-e/rep-e/rep06dec02-e.htm 
29. SUE BARNES, M.P. CHAIR, LARGE BANK MERGERS IN CANADA: SAFEGUARDING THE PuBLIC 
INTEREST FOR CANADIANS AND CANADIAN BUSINESSES REPORT OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON FINANCE, 
Mar. 2003, available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/committee/CommitteePublication.aspx?Sourceld=37542. 
30. DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, RESPONSE OF THE GOVERNMENT TO LARGE BANK MERGERS IN 
CANADA: SAFEGUARDING THE PuBLIC INTEREST FOR CANADIANS AND CANADIAN BUSINESSES, A REPORT OF 
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS STANDING COMMITTEE ON FINANCE, AND COMPETITION IN THE PuBLIC INTEREST: 
LARGE BANK MERGERS IN CANADA, A REPORT OF THE STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, TRADE 
AND COMMERCE, 25, June 23, 2003 [hereinafter "Government Response"]. 
31. /d. at 25. 
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officially postponed until the fall. 32 Unfortunately, elections were called for late 
June and resulted in a minority government. Neither the New Democratic Party 
nor the Bloc Quebecois, the two parties with whom the Liberals will have to 
work most closely, are supportive of bank mergers. 33 In light of political realities, 
it seems that the merger guidelines will be held in limbo for the foreseeable 
future. 34 As of this writing, the guidelines are still under development. 
Ill. WILL THE DIFFERENCES IN THE CANADIAN PROCESS ADDRESS THE 

CONCERNS OF THE 1998 MERGERS? 

As observers of the Canadian . banking scene patiently await the 
government's final guidelines on the kinds of transactions that will raise 
concerns, we might profitably ask whether the guidelines will have any effect on 
large bank mergers in light of the existing banking market in Canada and the 
approval process that is currently in place. 
Specifically, if we return to the concerns raised by Paul Martin in 1998, will 
the government's guidelines, regardless of their content, be capable of correcting 
the problems of undue concentration, decreased competition, and impact on 
Canada's economic and social policies? 
A. Will the Canadian Banking Market Be Too Concentrated? 
Concern about the concentration of economic power is a legitimate focus of 
banking policy. In the United States, concern over the concentration of economic 
power explains quite a bit about the structure of the banking industry. 
Throughout U.S. banking history the prohibition on interstate banking and the 
odd mixture of state branching policy was largely concerned with preventing 
undue concentration of economic power-in the first instance to prevent money 
center banks from dominating the banks in neighboring states, and in the second 
instance to prevent city banks from dominating country banks. Although U.S. 
interstate banking policy and branching policy has changed dramatically, federal 
banking law is still concerned with undue concentration. For example, as part of 
the antitrust analysis in bank mergers the Department of Justice calculates 
changes in the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ("HHI"), which is a measure of 
32. See Sinclair Stewart, No Merger Guidelines for Banks Until Fall: Goodale, GLOBEANDMAIL.COM, 
May 17, 2004, available at http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/ArticleNewsffPPrint/LAC/200405 17 /R 
BANK17/business/ROB. 
33. See Peter Moreira & Vipal Monga, Bank Mergers Likely Loser in Canada, YAHOO FINANCE, June 4, 
2004 (page expired, hard copy on file with author). The NDP's position opposing bank mergers is stated quite 
clearly in the dissenting opinion filed in connection with the Report of the Standing Committee on Finance of 
the House of Commons. See LORNE NYSTROM, THE PuBLIC INTEREST IMPLICATIONS OF LARGE BANK 
MERGERS: A DISSENTING OPINION, in Government Response, supra note 30. 
34. See Bruce Little, Federal Politics: Four Ministers for Business to Watch, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, 
July 21, 2004 at B2 (stating that conventional wisdom holds that "[n]o minority government will go to the wall 
by permitting unpopular mergers just to make bank shareholders happy."). 
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market concentration.35 Similarly, the Reigle-Neal Interstate Banking and 
Branching Act of 1994 sets concentration limits on combinations-no 
combinations that result in one banking organization controlling more than 10 
percent of the deposits nationwide or more than 30 percent of the deposits in a 
particular state can be approved under the statute. 36 
Canada is right to focus on concentration as a problem in of itself, separate 
from the impact it has on competition. Unfortunately for Canada, they are closing 
the door after the horse is out of the barn-the Canadian banking industry was 
already extremely concentrated, and the more broadly defined financial services 
sector has become increasingly concentrated as banks have bought up trust 
companies and other providers. 
If the Government continues to focus its analysis on concentration in the 
banking sector of the financial services industry, banks may be better off pushing 
for approval of so-called "cross pillar" mergers, especially between banks and 
insurance companies. These types of combinations may be more politically 
palatable.37 
B. What Effect Will Bank Mergers Have on Competition? 
Although undue concentration and lack of competition are conceptually 
distinct issues, they often go hand in hand; highly concentrated markets run a 
high risk of also being uncompetitive markets. With only five big banks ("Big 
Five banks") and a limited number of smaller banks, it is a fair question to ask 
whether the Canadian banking market is in fact competitive. One factor that 
could increase competition would be to allow wider access to the Canadian 
banking market by foreign financial institutions. However, Canadian policy has 
been hostile to foreign entrants. The widely held rule and barriers to U.S. entry 
have hobbled real competition in the banking sector. 38 
Foreign financial service providers, including the Americans, have found it 
very difficult to establish profitable retail banking operations in Canada.39 
Viewed from the outside, the Canadian domestic banking market is relatively 
35. See DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BANK MERGER COMPETITIVE REVIEW, available at http://www.usdoj. 
gov/atr/public/guidelines/6472.httn. 
36. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d)(2)(A) & (B)(ii). 
37. See Gerard Berube, Banks need to make their case, CA MAGAZINE.COM, June/July 2004, available at 
http://www.camagazine.com/index.cfm/ci_id/21540/la_id/l.htm. (noting that political priorities may be 
elsewhere). 
38. See Eric J. Gouvin, The Political Economy of Canada's "Widely Held" Rule for Large Banks, 32 
LAW & POL'Y lNT'L Bus. 391 (2001) (discussing the genesis of the rule, and comparing its application to that of 
the Mexican rule). 
39. See WILLIAM R. WHITE, THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE FfA AND NAFfA FOR CANADA AND MEXICO 
10 (1994) (noting that foreign banks in Canada have failed to achieve rates of return on equity that even equal 
the return available from Canadian treasury bills and pointing out that in the seventeen years since U.S. banks 
have been permitted in Canada they have a very limited presence, with Citicorp, the largest, having merely $4.8 
billion in assets, which amounts to about one half of one percent of total Canadian banking assets). 
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small and thoroughly controlled by the Big Five banks.40 Foreign competitors 
have recognized that the Canadian retail banking market is not worth fighting 
over. 41 Although many U.S. banks maintain a presence in Canada, it is clear they 
will never be major players there.42 
While foreign banks have had difficulty entering the banking sector, other 
lines of business have been available. Foreign entrants who have gone into 
Canada have largely by-passed the banking market and focused on other, less 
restricted, and more profitable, lines of business, such as credit cards and 
business lending.43 This niche strategy amounts to cream skimming: taking the 
profitable lines that used to belong to the Big Five banks and leaving the less 
profitable aspects of the Canadian banking market for the Canadian banks to 
rnaintain.44 Even though the Government recognizes that the lack of new entrants 
harms Canadian consumers, no policy articulated in Ottawa is going to make the 
Canadian general retail banking market more attractive to foreign entrants. 45 
While foreign entrants are finding the Canadian market a difficult nut to 
crack, Canadian banks themselves are finding opportunities for growth at horne 
to be scarce. An obvious path for these mature businesses to increase their 
bottom lines would be to consolidate operations, maximize revenues, and 
squeeze out all inefficiencies by exploiting any economies of scale that might 
exist in specific product lines or operations.46 However, this path is foreclosed to 
Canadian banks, so they instead are looking south for growth.47 Instead, most of 
the large Canadian banks have significant U.S. financial services businesses.48 
From the point of view of Canadian policy makers, the predicament of the 
40. See James R. Kraus, Canada Plan Would Permit Cross-Border Branches, AMERICAN BANKER, May 
22, 1997, at 22 (quoting Canadian banking experts, who remark that Canada has a technology and cost 
efficiency edge on U.S. banks, resulting in lower spreads and the need for high volume to cover costs). 
41. See Aaron Elstein, Canada Bars 2 Megadeals, Sees Threat to Competition, AMERICAN BANKER, 
Dec. 15, 1998, at I (noting that market conditions discourage foreign buyers). "For all its size, Canada's 
population is slightly smaller than California's." !d. 
42. See Kraus, supra note 40, at I (noting that Canada has been a "tough nut to crack" for U.S. banks 
and pointing out that in the seventeen years since U.S. banks have been permitted in Canada they have a very 
limited presence, with Citicorp, the largest, having merely $4.8 billion in assets, which amounts to about one 
half of one percent of total Canadian banking assets). 
43. See CHARLES FREEDMAN & CLYDE GOODLET, THE FINANCIAL SERVICES SECTOR: PAST CHANGES 
AND FuTuRE PROSPECTS 25 (1998) (noting that the dominant position of Canada's banks will be challenged by 
"global" banks and niche players). 
44. See Aaron Elstein, Canada Bars 2 Megadeals, Sees Threat to Competition, AMERICAN BANKER, 
Dec. 15, 1998, at I (noting that MBNA has become a major player in credit card operations, Wells Fargo has 
gone after small business, and lNG has made inroads in virtual banking). 
45. See Harvey Schachter, Ottawa Unveils it Plans for Financial Services, CANADIAN BANKER, July 1, 
1999, at 26 (reporting on a government study that found the lack of new entry is not in the best interest of 
Canadian consumers). 
46. See Gouvin, supra note 38, at 417-420 (summarizing the research on how the banking industry 
generally may or may not exhibit meaningful economies of scale). 
47. See Berube, supra note 37. 
48. See, e.g., Kevin Moran, Developments in Banking Law: 2000, VII. Global Banking-Canada/Latin 
America/Africa, 20 ANN. REv. BANKING L. 1, 79 (2001) (describing Royal Bank of Canada's ventures south of 
the border). 
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Canadian banks is not a problem, all things being equal. As long as financial 
services jobs stay in Canada, the government would just as soon see bank 
operations grow in other parts of the world. Indeed, the Canadian Bankers 
Association touts international banking as the ideal export.49 
C. 	 Will Allowing Consolidation Affect Canada's Ability to Execute its Economic 
Policy? 
This concern seems to be a variation on the idea that banks are in some way 
"special," so a government should always have a certain number of them 
around.50 In the United States, the question of bank "specialness" has been 
thoroughly debated. The proponents of the idea that banks are special51 argue that 
banks are unique players in the economy and deserve special treatment under the 
law because they possess three key characteristics: (1) they offer transaction 
accounts; (2) they serve as a backup source of liquidity for other financial institu­
tions; and (3) they serve as the transmission belt for monetary policy .52 
Opponents of the specialness idea have made the counter argument that the 
purportedly "special" characteristics are no longer unique to banks and that there 
is no special reason why banks and banks alone must provide those services. 5 3 
49. See Reforms Needed for Financial Services to Flourish Says CBA, CANADA NEWSWIRE, Oct. 29, 
1997 (noting that Canadian banks are major exporters, generating 40 per cent of the their earnings abroad while 
having 90 percent of their workforce located in Canada). 
50. Probably the clearest expression of the idea that banks are "special" is the so-called "too big to fail" 
doctrine. Under that policy, the federal deposit insurance funds made whole all of the depositors of key banks, 
regardless of whether they were fully covered by deposit insurance, on the theory that to allow the affected bank 
to fail would have caused major systemic disruption. The too big to fail doctrine may have been eradicated by a 
provision in the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1823(c)(4) (West 
Supp. 1996), which seeks to limit the insurance protection of large depositors. But proclaiming the demise of 
the problem may be premature. While this act ostensibly eliminates the too big to fail doctrine by strengthening 
the requirement of "least cost resolution" on the FDIC's actions, it should be noted that section 1823(c)(4) 
coexists with the statutory authority of the FDIC, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1823(c)(G) (West Supp. 1996), to make 
payments in excess of the insurance coverage amounts if necessary to protect the local economy where the bank 
failure occurred. How these two provisions will work together in the future remains to be seen. 
51. The specialness argument was most clearly articulated by Paul Volcker and Gerald Corrigan in the 
early to mid 1980s. See Paul A. Volcker, Statement before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer and 
Monetary Affairs of the Committee on Government Operations, U.S. House of Representatives, June 11, 1986. 
reprinted in 72 FED. RES. BULL. 541, 542-44 (1986); Paul A. Volcker, Statement before the Committee on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, Sept. 13, 1983, reprinted in 69 FED. REs. BULL 757, 758­
59 (1983); E. Gerald Corrigan, Are Banks Special? in FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS 1982 
ANNUAL REPORT, reprinted in JONATHAN R. MACEY AND GEOFFREY P. MILLER, BANKING LAW AND 
REGULATION, 68-73 (1992). See Anthony Saunders, Bank Holding Companies: Structure, Performance and 
Reform, in RESTRUCfURING BANKING AND FINANCIAL SERVICES IN AMERICA 157-62 (WilliamS. Haraf & 
Rose Marie Kushmeider, eds. 1988) (generally discussing and critiquing the specialness of banks). 
52. 	 Corrigan, supra note 51, at 70. 
53. SeeR. Aspinwall, On the "Specialness" of Banking, 7 ISSUES IN BANK REG. 16 (1983) (noting for 
example, that many non-banks provide transaction accounts which are essentially identical to traditional bank 
checking accounts); see also Jonathan R, Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Nondeposit Accounts and the Future of 
Bank Regulation, 91 MICH. L. REV. 237 (1992); David M. Eaton, Note, The Commercial Banking-Related 
Activities of Investment Banks and other Nonbanks, 44 EMORY L.J. 1187, 1200-14 (1995). Similarly, banks are 
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An idea related to, but distinct from, specialness is that we need banks in 
order to have a stable financial system. The biggest concern that flowed from the 
idea of specialness was the fear that bank failures could degenerate into banking 
panics that could topple the entire banking system. 54 Having a system of strong 
banks in Canada could be seen as a bulwark against catastrophic systemic failure. 
On closer examination of the available evidence, however, the fear of a bank 
failure expanding into the potential failure of the entire banking system appears 
unjustified.55 Such a catastrophic domino effect is in reality a very rare event. 56 lt 
is much more likely that a bank run would result in the redepositing of funds 
from weak banks into strong banks. 5 7 Therefore, if the economic policy justifica­
tion for denying bank mergers rests on systemic stability, that justification is 
subject to a strong empirical challenge. 
It seems the real "policy" reasons for the government to insist on a certain 
critical mass of Canadian banks involves social and political considerations. For 
reasons that are more political then economic, the Big Five banks maintain an 
extensive branch network across the country.58 It is unlikely that most of the rural 
branches pay for themselves. Traditionally, Canadian bankers have recognized 
that maintaining a branch system is a cost of doing business and their profitable 
lines of business have subsidized their community banking activities in small 
towns across the country. While such a scheme may be desirable social policy,59 
from the bottom line point of view of running a business it does not make sense. 
Of course, if national policies and objectives are under consideration in this 
context, Canada also needs to keep an eye on the benefits to be gained by 
no longer the only mechanism for providing liquidity, as technology has made it possible for borrowers to 
access the credits markets without using banks as intermediaries. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, 
Deposit Insurance, the Implicit Regulatory Contract, and the Mismatch in the Term Structure of Banks' Assets 
and Liabilities, 12 YALE J. ON REG. I, 9 (1995). Finally, banks' role in the implementation of monetary policy 
is clearly not as important as it may have once seemed. The Federal Reserve carries out its monetary policy 
goals primarily through the mechanism of open market operations. These purchases and sales of government 
securities are executed with the cooperation of many players-not just banks, but securities dealers and 
investors. Aspinwall, supra. 
54. See Anna J. Schwartz, Financial Stability and the Federal Safety Net, in RESTRUCfURING BANKING 
AND FINANCIAL SERVICES IN AMERICA, supra note 51, at 39 (1988) ("The main reason for widespread concern 
about bank failures is that they may degenerate into banking panics that produce a drastic decline of the money 
stock with disastrous effects on economic activity."). 
55. See id. at 162 ("One problem [with the specialness idea] has been the tendency to exaggerate the 
social costs of bank failures by loosely extrapolating the effects of an individual bank failure into a potential 
failure of the whole system."); Daniel R. Fischel eta!., The Regulation ofBanks and Bank Holding Companies, 
73 VA. L. REV. 301, 310-11 (1987) (discussing and dismissing the idea that bank failures are contagious). The 
economic models that predict dire consequences from bank failure are too oversimplified to justify larger 
systemic policy decisions. Saunders, supra note 51, at 158. 
56. Schwartz, supra note 55, at 39-40, 51-56 n.l (noting that prior to 1930 banking panics were 
uncommon and providing empirical evidence to support her conclusion). 
57. See Saunders, supra note 51, at 159 (citing a study concluding that most runs on individual banks 
would result in redepositing to sound banks). 
58. See Larry M. Greenberg, Canada's Banks Question Their Cocoon, WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 1998, at 
A17 (noting the political quid pro quo). 
59. See ANDREW H. MALCOLM, THE CANADIANS 242 (1986) (noting the role that Canadian banks play 
in the community and the opportunity for employment and social mobility afforded by banks in rural areas). 
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allowing bank mergers. If Canada's banks are not allowed to grow, they may not 
be able to hold their own against their larger foreign rivals. Indeed, Canada's 
financial centers are already quite marginalized, surpassed by London, New 
York, Tokyo, and Hong Kong, where greater market depth, historical 
international orientation, larger players, and commitment to innovation leaves 
Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver at a distinct disadvantage.60 By some 
measures, the world is already passing the Canadian banks by. The largest 
Canadian banks grow smaller by global standards with each passing year. 61 At 
times, Citicorp alone has a bigger market capitalization than the Big Five 
combined.62 
While the size of an institution is not necessarily a guarantee of business 
success, in the financial services marketplace size has some significance, 
especially in trade finance, an area Canadian banks have identified for growth. 63 
If Canadian banks intend to continue pursuing the international activity they have 
begun, they will need to find some way to increase the pool of capital on which 
they may draw. 64 Under current ownership rules, their options for increasing their 
capital are limited by their inability to sell out to a foreign banking organization 
or be acquired by a large commercial concern or even just to give a substantial 
equity stake to another Canadian bank. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The United States and Canada have adopted different approaches to 
approving large bank mergers. The U.S. approach places most of the discretion in 
the hands of administrative agencies, while the Canadian process gives an elected 
official the final say. Given the important role that the banking industry plays in 
the Canadian sense of national identity and the political volatility of the issue of 
bank mergers in Canada, it seems most unlikely that the Canadian bank merger 
process will permit any mergers to go through, regardless of the guidance 
eventually provided by the Department of Finance. The process is designed in a 
way that political sentiment will sway decisions on these matters, and given the 
current political climate, there is little chance that a member of the cabinet is 
likely to support bank mergers in any form. 
60. See Geoffrey P. Dobilas, The Canadian Financial System in International Perspective, in CANADA 
AND THE GLOBAL EcONOMY: THE GEOGRAPHY OF STRUCTURAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 84, 92 (John 
N.H. Britton ed., 1996) (observing the disadvantage of Canadian financial centers vis-a-vis London, New York 
and Tokyo). 
61. See Peter C. Newman, When the Banks Lost, Canada Lost, Too, MACLEAN'S, Dec. 28 1998, at 76 
(pointing out that Canada's banks rank between 70th and 80th worldwide in terms of size). 
62. Deirdre McMurdy, The Globalization Game, MACLEAN'S, Feb. 2, 1998 at 47. 
63. See James R. Kraus, Swing to lmpon Finance Favoring Big Banks, AMERICAN BANKER, Nov. 19, 
1998, at 20 (noting that trade finance is a line of business favoring large institutions). But see FREEMAN & 
GOODLET, supra note 43, at 17-21 (challenging the assertion that Canada needs large banks to stay competitive 
on the international market). 
64. See Dobilas, supra note 60, at 94 (noting the need for Canadian banks to expand their capital bases). 
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